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The last decade has seen a growing interest among economists on the effect of diversity on 
the provision of social goods and the stock of social capital. Indeed, in the workplace, 
cooperation, trust, and other social goods may be important elements of the smooth 
functioning of an office, but firm owners ultimately care about an office’s performance, as 
reflected in revenues, costs, and profits. We explore this next logical question: how does 
diversity affect ultimate performance? We have a unique data set from a firm which operates 
numerous small offices in the United States and abroad. They have provided us with eight 
years of individual-level employee survey data, which measure quantities such as level of 
cooperation, as well as office-level measures of diversity and performance over that period. 
We find some evidence that more homogeneous offices enjoy higher levels of social goods 
provision but that those offices do not perform any better and may actually perform worse. 
We speculate that one possible reason that the more homogeneous offices do not perform 
better despite higher levels of social goods provision is that they do not have as diverse a 
portfolio of skills, talents, and interests on which to draw. 
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As the American workforce has grown increasingly diverse, business and academic
leaders have questioned whether and how diversity contributes to some quantiﬁable
“bottom line.” Much of this increased diversity has arisen out of broader social
changes, and the consequent social beneﬁts, though diﬃcult to quantify, may be
quite important. With these social changes as a backdrop, the focus of this paper
is smaller but sharper. Given these larger social changes, it is still valuable to focus
attention on diversity in a market environment, that created by a ﬁrm and its work-
force. Regardless of the cause of the increased workplace diversity, it is the job of the
managers to encourage the greatest productivity possible from their units, maximiz-
ing proﬁts, perhaps, or some other quantiﬁable outcome. It is our goal, then, to shed
light on how diversity (or an environment supportive of diversity) is associated with
those outcomes.
The last decade has seen a growing interest among economists on the eﬀect of
diversity on the provision of social goods and the stock of social capital. Numerous
studies have found evidence that social goods are provided at a lower level in commu-
nities or groups exhibiting fragmentation on various dimensions. For example, Vigdor
(2001) ﬁnds that census response rates are lower in census tracts with higher ethnic
fragmentation. Costa and Kahn (2003) ﬁnd that desertion rates are higher in Civil
War military companies with higher age and occupational fragmentation. Glaeser,
Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) ﬁnd that trust is lower among Harvard un-
dergraduates when race and nationality fragmentation is higher. Several studies have
documented that school funding is higher in more homogenous communities (see,
e.g., Goldin and Katz (1999), Poterba (1997), Miguel and Gugerty (2002)). (See also
Costa and Kahn (2003) for an excellent survey of this literature.) These results are
intriguing and potentially quite important in contexts where social goods provision
is either the output of interest or is an important factor in the output of interest.
However, in some contexts, the social good may be an “intermediate good.” In the
1case of higher school funding in more homogeneous communities, for example, we
may ultimately be interested in the eﬀect that this homogeneity has on school quality
(both conditional and unconditional on its eﬀect on school funding). Indeed, in the
workplace, cooperation, trust, and other social goods may be important elements of
the smooth functioning of an oﬃce. But ﬁrm owners and central managers ultimately
care about an oﬃce’s performance, as reﬂected in revenues, costs, and proﬁts.
This paper explores this next logical question: how does diversity aﬀect ultimate
performance? A baseball team composed entirely of catchers might have a high
provision of social goods—they give each other tips on catching the knuckler, they
borrow each other mitts, they go out for beers—but ultimately they will surpass even
the ’62 Mets in futility on the ﬁeld. An economics department composed entirely
of junior econometricians might also have tremendous esprit de corps, but would,
we presume, have trouble attracting the best graduate students. Indeed, a military
company with low age and occupational fragmentation might enjoy a low level of
desertion but might not have the diversity of skills necessary to be successful in
battle.
We have a unique data set from a ﬁrm which operates numerous small oﬃces in the
United States and abroad. They have provided us with eight years of individual-level
employee survey data as well as oﬃce-level measures of diversity and performance over
that period. The survey data furnish us with several indicators of ﬁrm social capital
or corporate culture, such the level of cooperation among people in an oﬃce, and the
levels of employee satisfaction and morale. The data allow us to address two distinct
questions. First, broadly speaking, do we ﬁnd lower levels of social goods provision,
such as the extent of cooperation, in more diverse oﬃces? The lower level of social
goods provision was a robust ﬁnding in the studies cited above, but our results provide
an interesting complement to those, both because economists have previously focused
on the eﬀects of diversity in communities instead of workplaces,1 and because we are
1Costa and Kahn’s study of Union Army troops is a possible exception.
2able to measure diversity on two dimensions heretofore unexplored in this literature,
gender and tenure. We do, indeed, ﬁnd that higher oﬃce-level gender diversity is
associated with lower employee cooperation (and morale and satisfaction), but that
tenure diversity has little or no eﬀect.
In addition to our direct measures of oﬃce-level diversity, we also have employee
responses to a question about whether the ﬁrm is accepting of diversity. We construct
an oﬃce average of this response. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that oﬃces where the em-
ployees think the ﬁrm is accepting of diversity tend to be more cooperative, and have
higher morale and satisfaction. These two sets of results, seemingly at odds, might
be interpreted in the following way: employees like the idea of a diverse workplace—
and may therefore provide social goods more readily in a setting that they think is
supportive of diversity—but are actually more comfortable in a homogeneous setting.
While we think these results are provocative and contribute to the literature in a
number of ways, we want to focus also on a second important question: What is the
eﬀect of oﬃce diversity on performance? One can imagine a situation where diversity
leads to low cooperation (and perhaps low satisfaction) in a workplace but also to that
workplace having a diversiﬁed portfolio of skills to draw upon. We would presume
the ﬁrst eﬀect would hinder performance of most types—we measure performance
with oﬃce-level revenue—while the second would enhance it. Which eﬀect dominates
then becomes an empirical question, and one that we can, in principle, answer with
our data. Again, we look both at the eﬀects of diversity as well as the perception
among the employees that the ﬁrm supports diversity. We ﬁnd that this oﬃce-level
perception that the ﬁrm supports diversity has a negligible association with oﬃce-
level revenues. Actual gender diversity, on the other hand, is associated with higher
revenues, although this latter eﬀect diminishes when oﬃce-level ﬁxed eﬀects are in-
cluded. In addition, we ﬁnd both average tenure and tenure diversity in the oﬃce to
be important explanatory variables.2
2There is a related but distinct literature on how gender composition aﬀects workplace pro-
3In other words, our results suggest that, consistent with the previous economics
literature, employees are more cooperative in more homogenous settings. These more
homogenous units, however, seem to be less productive overall, perhaps because they
have a less varied portfolio of talents on which to call.
2 Social Capital in our Setting
The introduction cited a number of studies documenting the relationship between
diversity (of various types) and the provision of social good or the accumulation of
social capital. It is useful at this juncture to deﬁne what we mean by social capital,
oﬀer examples in a workplace setting, and relate those examples to other literature
as well as ways of measuring the stock of social capital.
For our purposes we follow Putnam’s (1995) deﬁnition: “By analogy with no-
tions of physical and human capital—tools and training that enhance individual
productivity—‘social capital’ refers to features of social organizations such as net-
works, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mu-
tual beneﬁt.” Much of the important work in social capital has been performed by
sociologists. In particular, distinctions between diﬀerent types of social capital have
been emphasized. Putnam (2000, 1995) has noted the diﬀerence between “bridging
capital” and “bonding capital.” The former brings together or bridges what other-
wise would be separate social groups and networks. So a workplace with high levels of
diversity might bridge otherwise separate worlds. On the other hand, “bonding capi-
tal” refers to relatively close ties that can foster cooperation in high stakes exchanges.
Granovetter (1973) made the seminal distinction of weak ties and strong ties, which
has also been applied in economic environments. Most notably Granovetter (1974)
examined the role of social networks in getting a job.
Empirical studies of the factors which aﬀect the stock of social capital, such as
ductivity and wages. Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) estimate that women’s marginal
productivities are less than men’s, but that women’s wages are lower still.
4ours, must grapple with the question of how to measure that stock.3 One possibility
would be to measure the size and nature of social networks, as was done in Karlan,
Mobius, Rosenblat and Szeidl (2009). They present a model of social capital as
social collateral, one in which an intermediary within a social network can facilitate
informal lending or borrowing in the absence of legally enforceable contracts. They
then test that model on social networks data in Peru. Such a measure would not
be relevant in our setting, of course—all employees in a particular oﬃce would know
each other well—but that paper suggests that the informal exchange of favors may
be an important component of social capital. In our setting, those favors would occur
within a ﬁrm and could be well proxied by a measure of how cooperative an oﬃce is.
Survey responses may be the best way to gauge such phenomena.4 Indeed, we
have data from employee surveys in our ﬁrm, such as responses to the question of
how cooperative the oﬃce is and how high morale is. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman
and Soutter (2000) use survey data as well, in conjunction with a “Trust” game, to
gauge social capital in their study. Unlikethem, we do not have responses to questions
about trust, though.
Two features of our environment deserve emphasis. First, unlike many of the
papers studying how diversity aﬀects social goods provision, or papers studying social
capital more generally, we look at these questions in a market setting. Second, our
speciﬁcsetting is within the ﬁrm. A striking feature about this environmentis that the
ﬁrm has incentives to foster social capital to advance its objectives. In particular, the
ﬁrm may wish to attract and reward workers to foster cooperation and reciprocation
on the job. Certainly, social capital created in the workplace may have positive
externalities beyond the ﬁrm, but we do still have an entity, in our case the ﬁrm,
which may internalize some of the externalities associated with social capital. Also,
3In some situations, a direct measure of the provision of social goods, such as whether a soldier
deserts, might be available. That is an example of an act which contributes to the stock of social
capital as opposed to a measure of the stock.
4See Putnam (2000) for a detailed account of the use of survey data to measure social capital.
5as in the theory of the ﬁrm, many possible “transactions” between employees can
beneﬁt the owners of the ﬁrm, but it may be too diﬃcult to monitor and reward
these transactions through an explicit contract. Rather, they are best accomplished
by employees exchanging long term favors.
3 Theory
In discussing these ideas, we ﬁnd it useful to refer to a theoretical model to provide
some structure as well as insight into the mechanims at play. Rob and Zemsky (2002)
(hereafter RZ) provide such a framework. Their model shows how employees in a
ﬁrm can be given incentives to contribute to social capital as well as the dynamics
of how a stock of social capital can persist or deteriorate over time. While they
do not explicitly discuss diversity, their model can be interpreted and modiﬁed to
incorporate various channels through which diversity can operate. It is helpful to
sketch the set-up of their model and discuss it in our empirical framework.
They start with a continuum of employees on the unit interval, each indexed by
an idiosyncratic tendency to feel guilty, ￿j ∼U [0,1] Each must choose two eﬀorts
levels, individual eﬀort eI and cooperative eﬀort eC. We think of the cooperative
eﬀort as contributing to the ﬁrm’s social capital. The ﬁrm cannot observe the split
between these two types of eﬀort but can measure output, which is a function of






0 min(eC(i),1)di, with a a constant where 1
2 <a<1. Note that an individual’s
cooperative eﬀort contributes strictly less to his measured output than his individual
eﬀort. Note also that a contribution to an employee’s output comes through the
cooperative eﬀort all of his coworkers have supplied. Here, we have normalized to 1
the amount of cooperation that is optimal from the ﬁrm’s perspective; therefore, any
additional cooperative eﬀort above 1 will not contribute to output.
Driving an employee’s decision how to divide his eﬀort is his utility function,
Uj = Wj − c(eI(j)+eC(j)) − (1 − eC(j))(r¯ eC + ￿j). Wj is his wage, c is a parameter
6governing how costly it is to him to supply eﬀort (of either type), and r is a parameter
describing ﬁrm-level reciprocity. We can think of the third term as representing guilt
that the employee feels from not contributing the optimal amount of cooperative
eﬀort. (1 − eC(j)) is the amount of shirking that he has to be guilty about and
(r¯ eC + ￿j) is the strength of his guilt. Note that the strength of guilt is a function
of oﬃce-level reciprocity, average cooperative eﬀort, and employee j’s idiosyncratic
guilt tendency.
We highlight a couple of the results of the model here which are particularly
relevant for our empirical exercise. First, they note that the level of r aﬀects steady
state cooperation (holding wage policy ﬁxed). High r means that it is more likely
that eC = 1 is a steady state of the repeated model and low r means that eC =0i s
more likely as a steady state. Second, with high r the model can have multiple steady
states selected by initial conditions. In particular, a high initial average cooperative
eﬀort likely results in cooperative eﬀort staying high, whereas a low intial ¯ eC likely
results in ¯ eC staying low.
For our empirical setting, we are interested in the channels through which diversity
can aﬀect both social goods provision and ﬁrm performance. One channel comes
immediately from the RZ model if one interprets reciprocity as being a function of
diversity. In other words, if a ﬁrm (or oﬃce within a ﬁrm) is more homogeneous, its
level of reciprocity could be higher because employees are more willing to contribute
to a social good in a community where others are similar to them.5 A second channel
is that we could modify measured output ˆ Q to include an extra term h which is a
direct function of heterogeneity. One interpretation of this extra term is that a more
heterogenous oﬃce has a broader portfolio of skills and experiences to contribute
and may, therefore, be more productive. Finally, although the RZ model is hard-
wired to ensure that cooperative eﬀort never exceeds the ﬁrm’s optimal level, one
could imagine that employees could have a social preference for cooperation that is
5Of course the relationship between diversity and social goods provision could be the opposite of
the one just posited—this is one of our empirical questions.
7diﬀerent from the ﬁrm’s preference. In that case, the guilt term in employee utility
might continue to be present even if the optimal amount of cooperation from the point
of view of the ﬁrm had been achieved, and equilibria could exist where cooperative
eﬀort is over-supplied.
Although we do not think of our paper as a formal test of this or any theoretical
model, we should note a few empirical implications of this model which could inform
our analysis. First, if less heterogeneity leads to higher values of r, higher levels
of cooperation are likely to result. These higher levels of cooperation could lead to
higher output (which would be the case in the base model) or lower output if the
social preference is for excess cooperation. Also, heterogeneity could have a direct
eﬀect on output through h. These are the implications that we will explore with our
main regressions. Two interesting but less central implications come out of the model.
The fact that multiple steady states of the model can occur with high r implies 1) the
possibility of a bimodal distribution of output in high r oﬃces and 2) more output
persistence in high r oﬃces. We will revisit these implications as well in the results
section.
4 Data
The data on which we base our analysis were provided to us by a professional services
ﬁrm which operates over sixty oﬃces in the United States and abroad. Their oﬃces
range in size from just a few employees to nearly 100 at their headquarters. The data
consist mostly of extensive employee satisfaction surveys which were administered
approximately annually from 1995 to 2002. These surveys were commissioned by the
ﬁrm, with anonymous employee responses. Table 1 contains summary statistics on
the variables we created with these data, which we describe below.
First, from the survey responses, we can identify the oﬃce, gender, and tenure of
the individual employees, enabling us to create oﬃce-level measures of diversity in
those two dimensions. For gender, we calculated the standard deviation of a dummy
8Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
At the employee level:
Satisfaction 1707 3.943 0.990 1 5
DPerception 1709 4.702 0.695 1 5
Morale 1683 3.592 1.017 1 5
Cooperate 1541 4.038 1.036 1 5
Male 1648 0.329 0.470 0 1
TenureYears 1665 2.570 2.087 0.25 7
At the oﬃce-year level:
Unemploy 272 4.77 1.83 1.4 12.2
Number 272 4.91 3.11 2 19
AvgSatisfaction 272 4.06 0.57 2 5
AvgDPerception 272 4.73 0.36 3 5
AvgMorale 272 3.73 0.66 1 5
AvgCooperate 251 4.14 0.64 2 5
AvgGender 272 0.29 0.25 0 1
AvgTYears 272 2.32 1.14 0.25 6.25
GendDiversity 272 0.58 0.42 0 1
TenureDiversity 269 0.11 0.11 0 0.60
Revenues 340 3219 3500 0.1 23,900
in thousands
9variable for male for each oﬃce and scaled it linearly to fall into [0,1], where 0 indicates
an all-male or all-female oﬃce and 1 is an oﬃce evenly divided. This variable is called
GendDiversity. In our data, the minimum value is 0 and the maximum is 1. Note
that this ﬁrm employs more women than men, and that we have both male-dominated
and female-dominated oﬃces among our observations where GendDiversity is near 0.
Also, the surveys ask how diversity is accepted at the ﬁrm:
The company provides a working environment that is accepting
of ethnic, lifestyle and gender diﬀerences.
(A) agree
(B) tend to agree
(C) ?
(D) tend to disagree
(E) disagree
We can, therefore, construct a measure of how accepting the employees think the
ﬁrm is of diversity at the oﬃce-year level. We average responses to that question over
all observations for a particular oﬃce-year to create AvgDPerception. (An individual
employee’s response is contained in DPerception.) It is possible that this measure is
a proxy for diversity on dimensions on which we do not have data, such as lifestyle
and ethnicity. Alternatively, one could interpret AvgDPerception as literally that—a
perception of how diversity is accepted at a particular oﬃce which could be at odds
with actual diversity.
We can also construct variables to capture other dimensions of ﬁrm diversity.
For tenure diversity, we calculated the standard deviation of tenure for each oﬃce,
and then divided by the number of employees in the oﬃce. Finally we scaled the
expression linearly so that the measure takes on values of 0 for oﬃces where everyone
has worked for the ﬁrm the same amount of time and positive values for oﬃces with
some variance in the amount of time the employees have worked there, 1 being an
upper bound in our data set.
In addition, we construct employee-level measures based on survey responses,
10Satisfaction, Cooperate, and Morale. These are based on the following questions of
the survey, respectively:
Taking everything into account, how satisﬁed are you with your
company as a place to work?
(A) very satisﬁed
(B) satisﬁed
(C) neither satisﬁed not dissatisﬁed
(D) dissatisﬁed
(E) very dissatisﬁed
There is good cooperation among people in my oﬃce.
(A) agree
(B) tend to agree
(C) ?
(D) tend to disagree
(E) disagree







As we noted in section 2, “social capital” refers to trust and norms of reciprocity
that facilitate cooperation, here within a ﬁrm. An auditor would not be able to ﬁnd
social capital within a ﬁrm’s books, but social capital could still vary across oﬃces, and
have very real consequences for ultimate outcomes. We therefore rely on indicators
or proxies for social capital rather than a direct measurement. We view Cooperate as
the most literal measure of social capital, or social goods provision, since employees
are eﬀectively asked to characterize the extent of the norm of reciprocity within the
oﬃce. For robustness, we employ additional indicators of employee attitudes. Morale
11and Satisfaction might also capture elements of social goods provision since they
are based on the employees’ perception of how high morale is in the oﬃce and how
satisﬁed they are with the oﬃce. Satisfaction, Morale and Cooperate are coded so
that higher reported satisfaction have higher numerical values, with a maximum of 5
for (A) answers and a minimum of 1 for (E) answers. Any (F) answers were dropped.
From the survey responses, these variables are positively but not perfectly cor-
related. (The pairwise correlations between Satisfaction and Morale is .61, between
Satisfaction and Cooperate is 0.36, and between Morale and Cooperate is .53.) So the
survey answers capture a more nuanced situation than employees being uniformly
“happy” or “unhappy” with their work, and that attitude pervading all responses.6
Table 1 also contains summary statistics on a measure of oﬃce performance, Rev-
enues. These come from internal data that the ﬁrm provided to us on their annual
revenues at the level of each oﬃce.
Finally, we augmented all of this information with a number of economic and
demographic variables for each of the cities in which an oﬃce is located. We collected
annual data on unemployment rate by city from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (or
comparable foreign agencies for the foreign cities), and it can be found in the variable
Unemploy. Summary statistics on this variable are included in Table 1. The other
economic and demographic measures, based primarily on census data, do not vary
over the course of our time period. Those are reported in Table 2.7 These variables
are largely self-explanatory, but a few comments are warranted. CPolitics, an index
of city political leaning, was constructed based on voting for the 2004 Presidential
election (and so only exists for US cities). Orange County had the maximum index
value in our data set of 227. Detroit had the minimum at 1. Also note that for
6Putnam (2000, p. 90) notes that “People with friends at work are happier at work.” If people
are less (or more) likely to become friends with co-workers as the oﬃce becomes more diverse, then
that is one channel for diversity to inﬂuence job satisfaction and ultimately ﬁrm performance.
7We relied on a number of diﬀerent sources to track down demographics for foreign cities. In
particular, we thank William Wheaton for providing us with data on oﬃce rental rates by city.
12Table 2: Summary Statistics, Continued
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
At the city level:
CAvgAge 61 33.9 2.7 29.6 41.7
CPolitics 47 75.3 58.8 1 227
CPercMinority 64 43.6 20.5 2.0 89.5
CPercMale 64 48.8 1.2 46.5 51.4
COﬃceRent 59 42.15 37.10 15.60 197.80
in annual dollars per ft
2
CPopulation 67 1462 1818 81 8008
in thousands
CPercMinority, the percent of minority residents in a city, the deﬁnition of minority
varied by country so that, for instance, whites were considered part of the minority
population in Japanese cities but not in US cities. Detroit, again, was at an extreme,




We turn ﬁrst to our results on the determinants of social capital within the oﬃce.
To do so, we use our employee-level data and focus on explaining perceived levels
of cooperation. Most particularly, we will be interested in measures of diversity as
explanatory variables, but we will also control for various employee, oﬃce, and city
characteristics.
Tables 3 and 4 contain results of these regressions. There are separate regressions
for three dependent variables, Cooperate, Satisfaction, and Morale, and the results
for Cooperate are reported in Tables 3. The explanatory variables consist of measures
13of particular interest, such as GendDiversity, TenureDiversity, and AvgDPerception,
as well as additional control variables. Controls at the employee level include the
employee’s job tenure, TenureYears, and a dummy variable for the gender of the
respondent, Male. Other controls are year of the response, Year, the fraction of males
in an oﬃce, AvgGender, and, in some speciﬁcations, city-level measures such as the
percent male, CPercMale, the percent minority, CPercMinority, the log of population,
LogCPopulation, the average age, CAvgAge, and oﬃce rental rates, COﬃceRent.W e
do not include oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects in the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations, but include them in
the last.8
Turning ﬁrst to speciﬁcation (1), results which explain the level of cooperation in
the oﬃces, we see that higher levels of gender diversity (a more equal mix of men
and women) are associated with lower levels of cooperation. This result, represented
by the estimated coeﬃcient of -0.168 on GendDiversity, has a p-value of 0.09. The
magnitude suggests that moving from an oﬃce evenly split between men and women
to either an all-male or all-female oﬃce, holding constant other characteristics, would
increase cooperation about one-sixth of a point on a ﬁve-point scale.9 We also see
that higher levels of tenure diversity (a mix across number of years that employees in
an oﬃce had worked in the ﬁrm) were associated with higher levels of cooperation,
although this result is not statistically signiﬁcant at traditional levels.
A striking result to come out of speciﬁcation (1) is the importance of AvgDPercep-
tion. Oﬃces where the employees, on average, believe their employer to be accepting
of diversity are more cooperative. In addition to being highly signiﬁcant (with a t-
statistic of 4.03), its magnitude is also noteworthy. The estimated coeﬃcient of 0.524
suggests that increasing oﬃce-average response to the question about how accepting
8Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2004) use a qualitative response model to explain determinants of
survey responses due to their discrete nature. We agree with the logic of their approach, although
for ease of interpretation we will report linear regression results. Our major conclusions are robust
to estimating an ordered probit model.
9Of course one cannot vary GendDiversity in an oﬃce without also varying Male and AvgGender,
but their estimated eﬀects on Cooperate were small enough to ignore for this counterfactual.
14the company is of diversity by one point increases cooperation more than a half point
on the same scale. This result bears a more careful examination. Initially, it seems
at odds with the ﬁrst result that more gender diversity is associated with less coop-
eration. One can think of at least two ways to reconcile these results. First, it is
possible that our measure AvgDPerception is a proxy for actual diversity in an oﬃce,
but diversity on dimensions other than gender and tenure. In addition to gender
diﬀerences, the question speciﬁcally mentions ethnic and lifestyle diﬀerences as well,
dimensions on which we have no data. We believe a more likely explanation is that
there is a distinction between a company which provides an environment accepting of
diversity and one which has actual diversity. The employees seem more cooperative
(and more satisﬁed overall, as we see below) in an environment supportive of diversity
but lacking in actual diversity.
The impact of TenureYears is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. One might
imagine that those with higher tenure would be more well-integrated into the oﬃce
culture, but other factors, such as boredom or job fatigue, might oﬀset this. We in-
cluded Year to absorb any possibly spurious association with time. It is not signiﬁcant
in speciﬁcation (1).
We wanted to ensure that changes in oﬃce-levelgender diversity were not aﬀecting
the sample’s level of Cooperate merely by adding more men or women to the sample.
So we control for the gender of the respondent with Male. The eﬀect is tiny and not
statistically signiﬁcant. Similarly, we also control for the fraction of the oﬃce that is
male, with AvgGender. In speciﬁcation (1) the eﬀect is, again, not signiﬁcant.
In interpreting these results, it is important to note that speciﬁcation (1) does
not contain oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects. One might think that a hypothetical San Francisco
oﬃce diﬀers systematically from a hypothetical Sheboygan oﬃce, and these diﬀerences
should be controlled for in the estimation. It is also the case, however, that our
identiﬁcation of certain eﬀects might be coming primarily from the cross-section, an
identiﬁcation that would be wiped out with the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects. In particular,
15we have, on average, four years of data10 for each oﬃce, a length of time when most
oﬃces would not have experienced signiﬁcant turnover, so we would expect that
much of our identiﬁcation of the diversity eﬀects would come oﬀ of the cross-section.
In order both to control for some city (oﬃce) characteristics and to preserve some
identiﬁcation oﬀ of the cross-section, we include speciﬁcation (2). Although none of
the city-level characteristics we include are signiﬁcant in this regression, the other
results are aﬀected. In particular, the coeﬃcient on GendDiversity is cut in half
and is no longer even marginally signiﬁcant. Note, though, that we lose a relatively
large fraction of our observations when we include the extra covariates due to missing
observations.
Finally, we include a ﬁxed eﬀects model, speciﬁcation (3). The results are consis-
tent with our concern about being able to identify eﬀects oﬀ of time series variation
alone. In particular, GendDiversity is not signiﬁcant. Notably, though, the coeﬃ-
cient on AvgDPerception increases somewhat and becomes more signiﬁcant with the
inclusion of the oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects. This ﬁnding is less surprising given that AvgDPer-
ception could be driven in part by ﬁrm-wide policy changes over time and, therefore,
have its eﬀect identiﬁed more by the time series.
Recall that while Cooperate was our preferred measure of social goods provision,
we have alternative measures, Satisfaction and Morale. Of the two, Satisfaction seems
less well-suited as a proxy for social goods provision because the sources of employee
satisfaction, though unlikely, could be entirely individual in nature. Morale, however,
has a more cooperative, or group-based, connotation. The results for Satisfaction and
Morale, found in Table 4, are similar in nature to those for Cooperate, but stronger
statistically. Higher levels of AvgDPerception are associated with large, statistically
signiﬁcantly higher levels of Satisfaction and Morale. But higher levels of actual gen-
10We have data for the maximum eight years for about a quarter of our oﬃces. Quite a few oﬃces
were either opened or closed during the eight year period, and for others, data are missing for a year
or two in the middle of the period.
16der diversity, GendDiversity, are associated with lower indicators of well-being, and
this association seems more persistent and signiﬁcant than in the ﬁrst set of regres-
sions. The coeﬃcient on GendDiversity is marginally signiﬁcant in speciﬁcations (1)
and (2) and solidly so in speciﬁcations (4) and (5). TenureYears, insigniﬁcant in
speciﬁcation (1), is negative and signiﬁcant in the Morale regressions, and marginally
so in the Satisfaction regressions. The estimated magnitudes for both of those eﬀects
are small, however. The control for Year also becomes signiﬁcant in all six speciﬁ-
cations. The same broad patterns in the results emerge, though. Recall that these
indicators of employee satisfaction, or proxies for workplace social capital, are not
perfectly correlated so the estimated relationships reﬂect three similar but distinct
patterns.
We take the following broad lessons from the results at this stage: actual diver-
sity is associated with lower levels of social capital (at least marginally), whereas the
perception at the oﬃce level that the ﬁrm supports diversity is associated with higher
levels of social capital. This latter result is present even after controlling for a ﬁxed
geographic eﬀect. We ﬁnd it interesting that most other explanatory variables were
not particularly close to being signiﬁcant—we would not have been surprised to ﬁnd
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent answers to these survey questions between men and women re-
spondents, for instance, or in male-dominated versus female-dominated oﬃces. Those
diﬀerences were largely absent, though.
We ﬁnd these results interesting and certainly suggestive of patterns where di-
versity can have important eﬀects in the workplace. We oﬀer them, however, with
a caveat. One might be concerned about the potentially endogenous placement of
employees in oﬃces. In particular, a ﬁrm might hire employees to achieve a certain
gender mix, for instance, and could possibly focus that hiring in oﬃces with lower
morale or cooperation. Although we cannot dismiss a concern such as this out of
hand, we would argue that this concern is not likely to be so important in our partic-
ular setting. The ﬁrm we study was quite young at the time and experiencing rapid
growth. While now it is a much more well-established and mature ﬁrm, in the late
171990’s, it was run by a set of college friends who largely hired additional friends of
theirs to start up oﬃces in cities where they were interested in moving. The ﬁrm was
run on a shoestring, and expenditures like corporate consultants to advise the ﬁrm on
corporate culture and diversity in hiring would not have been in the budget. Hiring
was not random, of course, but elements of the hiring process which could lead to
troublesome endogeneity for us were likely to have been absent. In addition, the fact
that we see all-male, all-female, and mixed oﬃces in the data also suggests that the
ﬁrm was not interested in targeting a certain gender mix.
5.2 Performance
While we care about these indicators of employee satisfaction as proxies for social
capital or corporate culture, they remain intermediate inputs. A ﬁrm’s ultimate aim
is to generate revenues and proﬁts. So in Table 5, we look at the association between
oﬃce-level attributes and the log of oﬃce-level Revenues. Of course in interpreting
these and other results, we are careful about inferring causality where correlation
is established. Nonetheless, we think it is valuable to document empirical correla-
tions that might be a subject of speculation in the academic literature and popular
discussion.
A comment about our dependent variable is warranted. Basic economic models of
ﬁrm behavior hold that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, not revenues, which suggests that our
primary focus should be on the eﬀects of diversity on ﬁrm proﬁt. Not surprisingly,
we do not have measures of oﬃce-level proﬁt, only revenues, nor do we have any
wage data. We were able to obtain data on oﬃce rental rates, which we include as
a covariate in one of our speciﬁcations below (although we do not have information
on the relative sizes of this ﬁrm’s oﬃces). To the extent that ﬁrms use revenues as a
rough proxy for proﬁts, though, our results will still be meaningful.
With that caveat in mind, we turn to Table 5. First note that we have added
additional explanatory variables as controls, such as oﬃce-average tenure, AvgTYears.
18We also include Unemploy, which is the unemployment rate in the oﬃce’s closest
metropolitan area. This potentially controls for local macroeconomic shocks. Finally,
we include YearsOpen, which is a variable equal to the year of the observation minus
the year of the ﬁrst observation in our data set for that particular oﬃce, and it is
meant to control for smaller revenues that oﬃces would generate before they became
established in a city.
Table 5 presents results from three speciﬁcations, our base speciﬁcation with a
smaller set of city covariates, our augmented speciﬁcation with the full set of city
covariates (but a smaller number of observations due to missing values), and a speci-
ﬁcation with oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects. Looking across all speciﬁcations, the estimated eﬀect
of AvgDPerception is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Recall that
this perception of the ﬁrm’s acceptance of diversity was an important determinant of
oﬃce cooperation, satisfaction, and morale. But, interestingly, it does not appear to
be associated with a revenue payoﬀ. Note that such a result indicates the important
distinction between “intermediate goods” such as ﬁrm social capital and the ultimate
outcome of interest for a ﬁrm. Also, a perception that the ﬁrm accepts diversity, lead-
ing to more cooperative and happier oﬃces, could still yield pecuniary gains to ﬁrm
owners that would not be picked up in this regression. For instance, high satisfaction
could reduce the salaries employees are willing to accept, even if such a perception
does not increase revenues.
Turning to additional results in Table 5, higher levels of GendDiversity are pos-
itively and signiﬁcantly associated with oﬃce revenue in our base speciﬁcation (1).
The estimated coeﬃcient of 0.45 implies that going from an oﬃce that is either all
male or all female to an oﬃce split equally between the sexes would be associated
with a revenue gain of 45%(!). Of course, the implications for ﬁrm behavior are less
clear cut, since the ﬁrm might have to make additional changes in order to change
the gender composition of its workforce, but the relationship uncovered in the sample
is still of interest. These results are consistent with a conclusion that the actual di-
versity of an oﬃce, at least in the gender dimension, gives it the diversiﬁed portfolio
19of skills that is essential to ultimate performance.
Of course we are interested in controlling for any source of spurious correlation.
For example, a hypothetical San Francisco oﬃce would operate in a more diverse
environment than a hypothetical Sheboygan oﬃce. And of course the Bay Area ex-
perienced macroeconomic shocks associated with the technology industry over this
time period. So the San Francisco oﬃce could have both higher revenue and higher
gender diversity than the Sheboygan oﬃce, but the gender diversity would not be
responsible for the revenue diﬀerential. We have the same concern regarding identiﬁ-
cation in the presence of oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects here as we had previously, so we included
speciﬁcation (2) as an intermediate step, controlling for a variety of city characteris-
tics which could be correlated with both diversity in an oﬃce and revenues. The core
results are robust to the inclusion of additional covariates, despite the signiﬁcant drop
in observations. In particular, the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the GendDiversity
coeﬃcient remains unchanged.
In column (3), we also report the results of a speciﬁcation with oﬃce-level ﬁxed
eﬀects. When we control for the oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects, the estimated contribution of
GendDiversity to oﬃce level revenue is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. As in our
results for employee satisfaction, much of our identiﬁcation of a genuine eﬀect may
be coming from the cross-sectional variation.
TenureDiversity is associated with a large, negative, and statistically signiﬁcant
revenue eﬀect, a result that survives including the ﬁxed eﬀects. Of course the oﬃces
themselves do not assign tenure diversity randomly. A new oﬃce could have diﬃculty
in generating revenue compared to an older, more established oﬃce, and the new oﬃce
could also have lower tenure diversity because a large group of employees could be
hired at the same time at the opening of the oﬃce. It is interesting to note, though,
that the negative tenure diversity eﬀect exists in the presence of a positive average
tenure eﬀect. Including an oﬃce-level ﬁxed eﬀect does not completely control for this
possibility, since a new oﬃce could still have a diﬀerent revenue stream over time
than an old oﬃce.
20Note that we did not include a speciﬁcation with number of employees as an
explanatory variable. Number of employees could proxy for one component of ﬁrm
cost, of course, but absent wage data, it would likelybe a poor proxy. Furthermore, we
felt that the strength of the relationship between oﬃce revenues and oﬃce employees
would mostly be arising from the mechanical need to hire additional employees as
oﬃce revenues increased. Therefore, these results should be viewed as a reduced-
form estimate of patterns in the data as opposed to any causal relationship.
Recall that in our discussion of the RZ model, we noted two additional implica-
tions. The fact that multiple steady states of the model can occur with high r implies
1) the possibility of a bimodal distribution of output in high r oﬃces (or at least higher
dispersion)11 and 2) more output persistence in high r oﬃces. To investigate these
possibilities, we took the residuals from our base model (1) of Log(Revenues) from
Table 5. If there was, in fact, a bimodal distribution of output for high r oﬃces, we
would expect to see a bimodal distribution of residuals from that regression for those
oﬃces. A kernel regression of the residuals from oﬃces with GendDiversity ≤ 0.5,
which we interpret as high r oﬃces, did not reveal any obvious bimodality. (Residuals
from high r oﬃces did, however, exhibit higher variance, 1.37 versus 1.00.) Second,
we regressed the residuals on lagged residuals by oﬃce as well as an interaction be-
tween lagged residuals and GendDiversity. Greater output persistence for high r
oﬃces should be manifested in a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate on the
interaction term. Strangely, however, the estimated coeﬃcient was signiﬁcant but
postive. We do not have a particular interpretation for this ﬁnding.
11Multiple equilibria for high r oﬃces could but need not result in a bimodaldistribution of output.
If the equilibria were close enough together relative to the variance of any error in the system, the
result could simply be higher dispersion but not bimodality.
216 Conclusion
The managers of ﬁrms, like baseball teams, face the challenge of assembling a work-
force and a culture that will succeed in the task at hand.
The results of this paper shed light on how actual and perceived diversity is associ-
ated with indicators of ﬁrm social capital and measures of ultimate oﬃce performance,
revenues.
We ﬁnd that the perception that a ﬁrm is supportive of diversity in an oﬃce is
strongly associated with indications of the level of cooperation in that oﬃce. Other
proxies for social capital or corporate culture, such as employee morale and satisfac-
tion, were also strongly higher in oﬃces in which this perception was higher. Nev-
ertheless, the presence of actual gender diversity was a signiﬁcant factor in reducing
these same measures of social capital.
In our second set of results, we investigate the determinants of oﬃce-levelrevenues.
We ﬁnd that the perception that the ﬁrm accepts diversity has no estimated payoﬀ
in this dimension. Interestingly, the actual gender diversity is associated with a
positive contribution to revenues, although this eﬀect is diminished once oﬃce-level
ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
Interestingly, the revenueresults suggest that whatever detrimental impacts actual
gender diversity had on the formation of ﬁrm social capital were outweighed by the
direct contribution of diverse personnel to the tasks at hand.
Although two of the three authors are Red Sox fans, we are reminded of the lesson
of the 1978 Yankees. Although the day to day operation of that team was far from
harmonious, the individual players contributed the diverse set of skills necessary for
collective success.
22Table 3: Results of employee-level regressions
Dep. variable: Cooperate
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
GendDiversity -0.168 -0.086 0.048
(-1.74) (-0.67) (0.36)
TenureDiversity 0.682 0.022 -0.542
(1.39) (0.04) (-1.07)
AvgDPerception 0.524 0.535 0.608
(4.03) (3.52) (6.36)
TenureYears -0.016 0.003 0.007
(-1.24) (0.16) (0.52)
Year -0.004 -0.015 -0.029
(-0.21) (-0.75) (-1.78)
Male 0.002 0.093 0.014
(0.02) (1.32) (0.22)












Constant 1.738 3.855 1.450
(2.70) (1.70) (3.06)
Observations 1440 1122 1440
Oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects? No No Yes
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. Coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level.
23Table 4: Additional results of employee-level regressions
Dependent variable:
Explanatory Satisfaction Morale
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GendDiversity -0.154 -0.128 0.020 -0.351 -0.226 -0.089
(-1.83) (-1.80) (0.17) (-3.59) (-2.24) (-0.77)
TenureDiversity 0.248 0.198 -0.383 0.836 0.430 0.417
(0.74) (0.46) (-0.92) (1.94) (0.89) (0.98)
AvgDPerception 0.621 0.684 0.672 0.634 0.691 0.795
(7.90) (8.89) (7.98) (5.16) (5.05) (9.33)
TenureYears -0.035 -0.049 -0.019 -0.063 -0.054 -0.042
(-1.87) (-2.84) (-1.53) (-5.66) (-3.02) (-3.33)
Year -0.072 -0.064 -0.082 -0.066 -0.058 -0.082
(-5.36) (-4.62) (-6.34) (-3.66) (-3.28) (-6.25)
Male 0.021 -0.039 0.029 -0.043 -0.048 -0.035
(0.41) (-0.72) (0.52) (-0.74) (-0.62) (-0.63)
AvgGender -0.102 0.077 -0.359 0.215 0.226 -0.028











Constant 1.635 1.491 1.411 1.270 2.098 0.474
(4.39) (0.78) (3.38) (2.09) (1.12) (1.12)
Observations 1579 1233 1579 1558 1216 1558
Oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects? No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. Coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level.
24Table 5: Results of oﬃce-level regressions
Dependent variable:
Explanatory Log(Revenues)
variables (1) (2) (3)
AvgTYears 0.298 0.226 0.247
(3.76) (3.31) (3.44)
AvgDPerception 0.041 -0.071 0.009
(0.23) (-0.26) (0.06)
GendDiversity 0.450 0.453 -0.065
(2.60) (2.74) (-0.44)




YearsOpen 0.464 0.261 0.121
(6.86) (2.61) (3.73)














constant 14.027 11.405 14.081
(13.54) (4.16) (17.56)
Observations 269 200 269
Oﬃce ﬁxed eﬀects? No No Yes
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. Coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level.
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